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ABSTRACT
Escalating commitment in organizations occurs in decisions
involving ambiguous information. In such decisions, experts often pro-
vide analysis and recommendations for action which may increase the
tendency toward escalating commitment. Devil's advocacy is a technique
for counteracting this process.
In this paper, Staw's (1976) escalating commitment task is used to
examine the effects of an expert report and a devil's advocate treat-
ment on the tendency to escalate commitment. Results show that an
expert report increases dollar allocations to a failing project and
subjects' estimates of the project's probability of success. A devil's
advocate critique appeared to reduce the effects of the expert report
though the results were only marginally significant.

INTRODUCTION
Those who must decide whether to make further resource commitments
to a faltering course of action can generally find arguments both for
and against escalation of commitment. Often the information they must
use to make the decision is incomplete, possibly biased, and ambiguous.
Under these conditions, recommendations by perceived experts may help
to reduce uncertainty and may therefore influence decision outcomes and
increase commitment (Schwenk, 1985a).
This paper deals with the role of expert reports in the promotion
of commitment and the question of whether a devil's advocate treatment
can reduce the effects of expert reports. Past research on escalating
commitment will be reviewed and the ways experts may promote escalating
commitment will be discussed. Next, the role of devil's advocacy in
reducing escalating commitment will be considered. Hypotheses on the
effects of expert reports and devil's advocacy will be developed on the
results of an experiment to test these hypotheses will be described.
The implications of the results will be discussed in the concluding
section.
Escalating Commitment and Entrapment
A brief review of the research on escalating commitment and entrap-
ment will serve to clarify the nature of the phenomena. Many important
organizational projects involve an initial commitment of resources
(time, effort, money, etc.) followed by failure and a need for addi-
tional commitment which may save the venture. In such situations
decision-makers must determine whether or not to commit the extra
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resources and risk "throwing good money (or effort) after bad."
Examples provided by Hall (1982) and Staw (1981) show that individuals,
businesses, and countries sometimes continue to commit resources to
failing projects long past the point when such commitment seems reason-
able to outside observers.
Staw (1981) has summarized several studies dealing with such
"escalating commitment" and used them to develop a theoretical model of
the variable affecting the commitment process. Staw (1976) used a
business case in which study participants play the role of a corporate
financial officer who is asked to allocate research and development
funds to one of two operating divisions of a company. Subjects were
then given feedback on their initial decision (either positive or nega-
tive, indicating success or failure) and asked to make a further allo-
cation of R&D funds. Staw (1976) found that more funds were allocated
after failure than after success when subjects were personally respon-
sible for the initial commitment decision. Three subsequent studies
used similar laboratory tasks (Staw and Fox, 1977; Staw and Ross, 1978;
Fox and Staw, 1979).
Conlon & Wolf (1980), using Staw & Ross's (1978) development
loan task, collected information on the problem-solving strategy of
subjects. They found that subjects using a calculating strategy
responded differently to information on the likelihood of the cause of
the initial failure persisting into the future than did subjects who
used a non-calculating strategy. Calculators did not retain as much
commitment as non-calculators in the face of information indicating a
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long term cause of failure. This suggests that the way decision-makers
frame and approach a decision may determine the likelihood they will
escalate commitment.
Another line of research, on entrapment, deals with a process which
is fundamentally the same as escalating commitment (Brockner and Rubin,
1984). Brockner, Shaw, and Rubin (1979) showed that subjects invested
more when they had to make an explicit decision to terminate a series
of investments than when the series was self-terminating. They also
invested less if they set a limit on their investment and informed the
experimenter of it before the experiment began.
Brockner, Rubin, and Lang (1981) found that entrapment was greater
when subjects were informed of the advantages of investing a large
amount than when they were given the virtures of investing conserva-
tively. Social anxiety and the presence of an audience also lead to
greater entrapment. Brockner, Fine, Hamilton, Thomas, and Turetsky
(1982) investigated the notion that factors like the presence of an
audience and information about costs have different impacts at dif-
ferent stages in the entrapment process. They found that cost infor-
mation had effects on degree of entrappment when the information was
introduced early in the process. The perceived presence of an audience
affected entrapment when the audience was introduced late in the pro-
cess.
The Role of Experts in Escalating Commitment
Since escalating commitment tends to occur in situations in which
information is ambiguous, expert statements may provide direction and
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help reduce ambiguity. In this way, escalating commitment on the part
of experts or organizational leaders who employ them may be trans-
mitted to others in the organization.
The research on escalating commitment has not explicitly addressed
the promotion of commitment by experts. However, there is indirect
evidence that experts' statements may increase this tendency toward
escalation.
Fox and Staw (1977) conducted an experiment in which they used
Staw's (1976) decision case and gave some subjects a statement indi-
cating that there was a high likelihood additional R&D funding would
help the company's financial condition while other subjects received a
statement indicating a low likelihood. They found that subjects in the
first treatment condition committed significantly more money than those
in the second treatment condition during the first of a series of
financial allocation decisions. Staw & Ross (1978) used a laboratory
task involving a loan for a development project which had experienced a
setback and gave subjects different statements regarding the cause of
the setback. Subjects allocated more funds when the indicated cause
was exogenous to the program (unlikely to persist into the future)
than when there was an endogenous cause (one likely to continue). They
also responded more strongly to this information after failure than
after success.
Experts in organizations may influence decision-makers' interpreta-
tions of negative performance or performance downturns. Since their
reports serve to structure ambiguous data, they may cause contributors
to overestimate the likelihood that increased commitment will improve
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the situation (Fox and Staw, 1977), and to attribute failures to exoge-
nous causes (Staw and Ross, 1978). They may also cause contributors to
use a noncalculating strategy (Conlon & Wolf, 1980), to neglect
investment limits (Brockner et al., 1979), to consider the advantages
of investing large amounts (Brockner et al., 1981), and to ignore
information about costs (Brockner et al., 1982).
The material previously discussed suggests the following hypothesis:
H : Decision-makers given an expert report recommending increased
investment will invest more money and express more confidence
in a failing course of action than those not given such a
report.
Devil's Advocacy and Escalating Commitment
To reduce the possible negative effects of expert reports on deci-
sions, it is desirable to bring multiple conflicting views to bear on a
decision (Schwenk, 1985b). One technique for doing this is devil's
advocacy. This technique involves the development of a critique of the
course of action advocated by an expert and the presentation of the
critique along with the expert's plan. Schwenk (1985b) discusses the
alternative approaches to devil's advocacy as well as the laboratory
and field research on its effectiveness. It has been shown to reduce
the impact of expert reports and improve decision-making in a variety
of tasks (Cosier, Ruble, and Aplin, 1978; Schwenk, 1982; Schwenk,
1984a). Schwenk (1985c) and Schwenk and Thomas (1983) have suggested
that devil's advocacy should reduce the effects of decisional biases
which may lead to escalating commitment. However, this proposition has
not been tested experimentally.
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The material previously discussed suggests the following hypothesis:
H : Decision-makers given a devil's advocate critique in addition
to an expert report recommending increased investment will
invest less money in a failing course of action than those
given the expert report alone.
METHOD
A laboratory experiment was conducted using the A&S case which is a
financial decision task, used in many previous experiments on escalating
commitment (Staw, 197b and 1981; Staw and Fox, 1977). This is a busi-
ness case which describes a company with two operating divisions
(consumer products and industrial products). Subjects play the role of
a corporate financial officer who's duty it is to allocate research and
development funds to one of these two divisions. After making the ini-
tial allocation, subjects receive feedback in the form of statistical
data on sales growth and profitability for both of the divisions for a
three-year period following the initial allocation. Subjects are then
informed that $20 million in R&D funds is available to them to allocate
to the previously funded division or to reserve for other uses. Sub-
jects then decide how much they will allocate to the previously funded
division and fill out a post-task questionnaire.
One hundred twelve business school undergraduates participated in
the experiment. In addition to choosing one of the two divisions for
the initial allocation and selecting a dollar amount for the second
allocation, subjects were asked to provide their probability of posi-
tive net profits for the next three years with the additional alloca-
tion they had just made.
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Treatment Conditions
Twenty-eight subjects were randomly assigned to each of four treat-
ment conditions. The first two treatment conditions duplicated those
found in Staw's (1976) study. Experimental materials were obtained
from Staw to insure that the treatments were the same. In the first
condition, after their initial choice of the industrial or consumer
products divisions for additional R&D funding, subjects received feed-
back indicating their chosen division had achieved increased profit-
ability and sales. This was essentially "success" feedback.
in the second treatment condition, subjects received feedback indi-
cating that their chosen division had sustained increasing losses and
that top management was displeased with the division's performance.
This consituted "failure" feedback.
In the third condition, in addition to failure feedback, subjects
received a report from "an advisory committee at the A&S company" which
contained an analysis suggesting that the company's losses were due to
insufficient funding and that more money should be committed to this
division.
In the fourth condition, subjects received all the materials given
to the subjects in the third treatment condition. In addition, they
were given a report from "a second planning committee at the A&S com-
pany" which questioned the assumptions in the first committee's
analysis and the recommendation that more money should be allocated to
the division. The combination of the expert report and the critique
represents the essential feature of the devil's advocate approach as it
was used in several previous experiments (Cosier et al., 1978; Schwenk,
1982, 1984a, 1985b).
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RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
In order to determine whether the subjects carefully read the
advisory committee recommendations, they were asked to indicate on a
post-task questionnaire the type of recommendations they received.
They were given three choices:
1) a single set of recommendations
2) two different and conflicting sets of recommendations
3) two sets of recommendations which were basically the same.
Eighty-nine percent of the subjects given the Expert Committee Report
and ninety-three percent of subjects given the Devil's Advocate treat-
ment correctly identified the treatment they received.
In addition, subjects were asked to indicate using a six-point
scale, the extent of their agreement with the statement, "Investing
in research and development is clearly not the way for this company
to improve sales and earnings." A one-way ANOVA on subjects' respon-
ses to this question indicated that the differences were significant
(F = 4.35, p < .005). Duncan multiple range tests showed that sub-
jects given the failure feedback only expressed more agreement with
this statement than those given the success feedback (p < .05) and
those given the failure feedback with the report (p < .01). Those
given the devil's advocate treatment expressed more agreement with
this statement than those given success feedback (p < .05) and those
given failure feedback with the expert report (p < .05). These
results show that the expert and devil's advocate treatments had the
intended effects on subjects' confidence in the efficacy of increased
investments
.
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Dollar Commitment and Probability of Success
Table 1 summarizes the results of the experiment with respect to
the two major variables examined. One-Way ANOVAs showed that the dif-
ferences due to treatments were significant for Dollar Committments
(F = 5.73, p < .001) and for Probability of Success (F = 6.11, p < .001)
Subsequent Duncan Multiple Range tests showed that subjects given the
failure feedback with the expert report recommending reinvestment com-
mitted significantly more money than those given failure feedback, only
(p < .001) and significantly more than those given the success feedback
(p < .05). Thus the results of the experiment provide support for
Hypothesis 1. Those given the devil's advocate treatment invested
signficantly more than those given failure feedback only (p < .05), and
less than those given the experts report, though this difference was
only marginally significant (p < .10). Thus the results provide mar-
ginal support for Hypothesis 2.
Duncan Multiple Range tests dealing with subjects' probability of
success showed that those given only success feedback gave a higher
probability of success than those given only failure feedback (p < .001)
and those given the devil's advocate treatment (p < .01). Those given
the failure feedback plus the expert report gave a higher probability
of success than those given the failure feedback only (p < .05). Thus,
the results provide support for Hypothesis 1. Those given the expert
report gave a higher probability of success than those given the
devil's advocate treatment though this difference was only marginally
significant (p < .10).
One interesting finding is the failure to replicate Staw's original
escalating commitment effect. Subjects given the success feedback
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invested more than those given the failure feedback, though this dif-
ference was only marginally significant (p < .10).
DISCUSSION
The failure to replicate Staw's original results in this experiment
requires some explanation. Given the fact that the experimental
materials were provided by Staw, and the experiment was conducted at
the same university in which the original Staw (1976) experiment was
done, the results are somewhat surprising. However, other recent
research has also failed to demonstrate escalation of commitment using
this same task. Singer and Singer (1985) used a task in which "The
exact experimental procedures of Staw's (1976) high responsibility and
negative feedback condition were followed" (1985, p. 817). In other
words, their treatment condition was the same as the "Failure Feedback
Only" condition in this experiment. They found that subjects' mean
allocation was $9.27 million which is much closer to the dollar allo-
cation for the Failure Feedback condition in this experiment ($8.89
million) than it is to Staw's original results for this treatment con-
dition (13.07 million). Bateman (1983) conducted an experiment using
the A&S decision case and found no significant difference between
dollar allocations for subjects in the success and failure condition.
Since the materials used in these experiments were similar if not
identical to those used by Staw, it is likely that the failure to
replicate Staw's results is due to differences in subjects. It may be
that the declining fortunes of business since Staw's original experi-
ment has made students less optimistic about the possibility that
initial performance declines can be reversed and less willing to
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continue investment. Or, it may be that business school students are
now more attuned to financial performance measures in making decisions
because of differences in business education between the mid 1970s and
the present time. These explanations, and others, should be investi-
gated in future research.
However, this experiment has shown that escalating commitment can
be promoted by an expert report recommending increased investment. The
effect of the expert report was so strong that subjects given the
failure feedback, and the expert committee report invested more than
those given success feedback. This testifies to the power of an expert
report when decision-makers are operating in an ambiguous environment.
The results of this experiment provide marginal support for the
suggestions of Schwenk (1985c) and Schwenk and Thomas (1983) that
devil's advocacy may reduce the tendency toward escalating commitment.
Schwenk (1985c) has suggested that devil's advocacy should reduce esca-
lating commitment because it diminishes the effects of decisional
biases which produce such commitment. Further, devil's advocacy has
been shown to reduce the effects of expert advice in many different
types of decisions (Cosier et al., 1978; Schwenk, 1982, 1984a, 1985b).
Given these facts, it was expected that the devil's advocate treatment
would have stronger effects in this experiment. However, the mar-
ginally significant effect for the devil's advocacy supports the pro-
position that devil's advocacy may somewhat weaken the effects of an
expert report encouraging escalating committment. Future research
should examine more closely the effects of expert reports and devil's
advocacy on subjects' decision-making and information processing,
perhaps through the use of protocol analysis.
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The expert report did not increase subjects' probabilities of suc-
cess as much as commitment. However, it did have a moderate effect
which was reduced to some extent by devil's advocacy. Not surprisingly,
subjects receiving the success feedback expressed the highest probabil-
ity of success, though they did not allocate the greatest amount of
money. Subjects given the failure feedback, with the expert report
gave the second highest probability of success. Though the difference
between this group and the group receiving the devil's advocate treat-
ment was only marginally significant, this result provides support for
the claim that devil's advocacy may reduce the confidence which accom-
panies escalating commitment.
Devil's advocacy reduces confidence as well as reducing the ten-
dency toward escalating commitment. Thus, it may reduce commitment to
a mistaken course of action but it may also reduce the confidence
necessary for a sound course of action to succeed. Some support for
this speculation was provided by Schweiger, Sandberg, and Ragan (forth-
coming) who showed that decision-makers in groups given a devil's
advocate treatment expressed less acceptance of the groups' decisions
than those in groups given a treatment designed to promote consensus.
Thus, devil's advocacy appears to have complex effects which may both
help and hinder effective decision-making. Future research should deal
with the effects of devil's advocacy on confidence in a course of
action as well as commitment to it.
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TABLE 1
Means and Standard Deviations for
Dollar Commitments and Probabilities of Success
A) Success
Feedback
Only
B) Failure
Feedback
Only
C) Failure
Feedback
with
Expert
Report
D) Failure
Feedback
with Devil's
Advocate
Treatment
Dollar Commitment
(in millions)
Mean
11.25
8.89
14.21
12.00
Standard
Deviation
3.83
5.27
5.05
5.12
Probability
of Success
Mean
.80
.60
.74
.64
Standard
Deviation
.13
.26
.1!
.20
**
***
****
p < .10
p < .05
p < .01
p < .001
Dollar Commitment Probability of Success
C > b****
C > A**
D > B**
A > B*
C > D*
A > B****
A > D***
C > B**
C > D*
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